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Abstract
In the present paper we introduce heterogeneity in productivity, entry cost and demand
shocks in both domestic and foreign market. Depending on their characteristics firms
choose to become pure exporters, ordinary exporters or non-exporters. Pure exporters
serve exclusively foreign markets, ordinary exporters both markets and non-exporters
exclusively home markets. Pure exporters face lower demand-adjusted foreign entry
cost than demand-adjusted domestic entry cost. Pure exporters have lower productivity
than ordinary exporters and non-exporters. Therefore depending on the share of pure
exporters, the effect of trade on average productivity can be positive or negative. How-
ever, the effect of trade on welfare is positive because trade increases the set of available
goods. Moreover we explore the effects of trade liberalizations. In particular, a decrease
of foreign entry cost across firms pushes some pure exporters and non-exporters out of
the market and some ordinary exporters to become pure exporters or non-exporters.
Finally, we provide the supportive empirical evidence.
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1 Introduction
In a dominant part of the literature on international trade it is assumed that firms serve the
domestic market (non-exporters) or serve both the domestic market and the foreign market
(ordinary exporters). However in many countries a large share of firms serve exclusively the
foreign market (pure exporters). Naturally firm characteristics that make firms choose to be
pure exporters are different from the characteristics that make firms choose to be ordinary
exporters. Therefore, studies on the impact of trade that are ignoring the presence of pure
exporters ignore a large part of trade. In the present paper we provide a general model
of pure exporters, ordinary exporters and non-exporters and study the impact of trade in the
presence of pure exporters. The results suggest that depending on the share of pure exporters
the average productivity of exporters can be lower or higher than the average productivity
of non-exporters. The presence of pure exporters makes the impact of trade on average
productivity arbitrary. However trade increases welfare because trade increases the set of
available varieties.
We consider a general equilibrium model with a continuum of heterogeneous firms in the
spirit of Melitz (2003). Firms face idiosyncratic shocks with respect to productivity, entry
cost for domestic as well as foreign market and demand in domestic as well as foreign market
as in Eaton et al. (2011). Based on their shocks firms choose to be pure exporters, ordinary
exporters, non-exporters or non-active. Hardly surprising we find that: a pure exporter
faces lower demand-adjusted foreign entry cost than demand-adjusted domestic entry cost;
and, its productivity allows it to earn profit in the foreign market, but not in the domestic
market. It is the reverse for non-exporters. A ordinary exporter earns profit in both domestic
and foreign market given its productivity and a non-active firm cannot make profit in any
market. In our model, the joint distribution of productivity, entry cost for domestic and
foreign market as well as demand in domestic and foreign market endogenously determines
the distribution of firms.
Lower demand-adjusted foreign entry cost than demand-adjusted domestic entry cost
has at least two possible sources: relatively low foreign entry cost or relatively high foreign
demand. For China, provinces (and in some cases even cities) compete with other provinces
and build barriers to trade to protect their own firms (Young, 2000). Therefore the domes-
tic market is quite segmented. As a consequence Chinese firms can face relatively high
domestic entry cost. Moreover firms participating in the global production fragmentation
can face relatively low foreign entry costs because of their experiences or networks with
foreign firms. Relatively high demand in foreign markets can happen when they locate in a
small or developing country. Note that a firm with relatively high foreign demand may have
lower demand-adjusted foreign entry cost than demand-adjusted domestic entry cost, even
its foreign entry cost is higher than domestic entry cost.
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In our model, pure exporters, ordinary exporters and non-exporters coexist. The distri-
bution of productivity, entry cost and demand endogenously determines the share of pure
exporters. In Theorem 2 we show that the average productivity of exporters can be lower
than the average productivity of non-exporters. The reason is that the productivity of pure
exporters is lower than productivity of non-exporters and ordinary exporters. Therefore
the productivity difference between exporters and non-exporters or productivity premium is
negatively related to the share of pure exporters. So if the share of pure exporters is large,
then the premium will be negative. The result is surprisingly different from empirical as
well as theoretical studies that neglect pure exporters. We provide supportive evidence to
these results in the empirical section.
Exploring the impact of trade on equilibrium we next study a move from autarky to trade.
Trade on the one hand forces firms with low productivity and high demand-adjusted foreign
entry cost out of the market; and, on the other hand induces firms with even lower pro-
ductivity but low demand-adjusted foreign entry cost to enter the market as pure exporters.
Therefore if trade results in a large share of pure exporters, then the move from autarky to
trade can lower average productivity as we show in Theorem 3. The results indicate that
studying the impact of trade without considerations of pure exporters can be misleading.
We study the effects of trade liberalizations interpreted as changes of the conditional
distribution of foreign entry cost and variable export cost. A decrease in foreign entry costs
raises the minimum productivity needed to serve both domestic and foreign market. There-
fore among firms with any given combination of demand-adjusted domestic and foreign
entry costs, the least productive firms (pure exporters or non-exporters) are forced out of the
market and the least productive ordinary exporters become pure exporters or non-exporters
as described in Theorem 5. A decrease in variable export costs raises the minimum produc-
tivity needed to serve the domestic market and decreases the minimum productivity needed
to serve the foreign market. Hence some non-exporters are forced out of the market and
some non-active firms and ordinary exporters become pure exporters as described in The-
orem 6. The effects of trade liberalization are channelled through labor markets, where
competition for labor becomes more intensive resulting in higher real wage.
In empirical section, we provide the supportive evidence of the model. As in Defever
and Rian˜o (2012), we define pure exporters as the exporters that sell at least 90% of their
gross sales in foreign markets. Firstly we observe the pervasive existence of pure exporters
across countries. In China, 11% of all firms and 40% of all exporters are pure exporters.
According to the World Bank enterprise surveys in 135 countries, pure exporters account at
least 7% of all firms in more than 25% of the countries, and account at least 19% (10%) of all
exporters in more than 50% (75%) of the countries. In the model, the share of pure exporters
depends on the distribution of firm characteristics. Therefore different distributions of firms
across countries generate different shares of pure exporters. Secondly we document the
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non-trivial roles of pure exporters in economies. In China, pure exporters export 53% of
total exports. Moreover, the average exports of pure exporters are 1.65 times of the average
exports of ordinary exporters. Pure exporters account for 22% of gross sales, 33% of total
employment, 14% of fixed asset and 15% of total asset of all exporters.
Thirdly we estimate the total factor productivity of Chinese firms and show that pure ex-
porters have lower productivity than non-exporters and ordinary exporters have higher pro-
ductivity than non-exporters. Controlling for firm size, the productivity of pure exporters is
1.7% lower than the productivity of non-exporters and the productivity of ordinary exporters
is 1.2% higher than the productivity of non-exporters. The pattern is robust to variations in
the definition of pure exporters (export at least 95%, 99% and 100% of gross sales) and in
the estimation of productivity (revenue and value-added function estimated with the Olley
and Pakes (1996) approach as well as value-added function estimated with Levinsohn and
Petrin (2003) approach). Moreover, the pattern holds in most of the sectors. The empirically
observed pattern is consistent with our model: productivity of pure exporters can be lower
than productivity of non-exporters.
Fourthly we find that the productivity premium of exporters can be negative and is neg-
atively related to the share of pure exporters as predicted by our model. In particular, the
productivity premium is negative in 16 sectors out of 27 sectors and is statistically signif-
icant in 11 sectors. The simple average across these 11 sectors shows that exporters have
2% lower productivity than non-exporters. Furthermore, our estimations suggest that as the
share of pure exporters is increased by 1%, the premium decreases by 0.083%. Our results
also suggest if the share of pure exporters is larger than 14.5%, then the productivity pre-
mium of exporters will be negative. The results are very robust for alternative definitions of
pure exporters and alternative productivity estimations.
Obviously pure exporters and processing firms are related. Processing firms simply
produce final products or intermediaries for foreign firms. However, pure exporters are not
necessarily processing firms and processing firms are not necessarily pure exporters. In
Defever and Rian˜o (2012) it is found that 51.6% of processing firms are pure exporters and
37.0% of pure exporters are processing firms. In our model all firms transform inputs to
outputs, so there is no role for processing firms. However, the model can potentially explain
why processing firms become pure exporters because the logic behind the choice to become
processing firms should be the same as the logic leading firms to become pure exporters,
namely profit maximization. Since firms directly sell their production to other multinational
firms that may allocate the sales across the world, they face low demand-adjusted foreign
entry cost, i.e., low foreign entry cost or high foreign demand.
Lu (2010), Defever and Rian˜o (2012) and Lu et al. (2014) provide different theoretical
explanations for the existence of Chinese pure exporters. In Lu (2010) pure exporters exist in
sectors that have comparative advantage, i.e. where the locally abundant factor is intensively
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used. In these sectors, prices are higher in the foreign market than in the domestic market
because the relative price of the locally abundant factor is higher in the foreign market.
Hence competition in the foreign market is less intensive. As a result, less productive firms
solely serve the foreign market and become pure exporters. However, we have documented
empirically that pure exporters exist in all sectors in China. In Defever and Rian˜o (2012),
most of the Chinese pure exporters are located in the special economic zones and are entitled
to a preferential tax scheme. Therefore in their model, pure exporters sacrifice the domestic
market in return for the tax advantage. However, a large share of pure exporters exist in a
wide range of countries. Our model is not relying on the tax scheme, and thus can be applied
to other countries. Lu et al. (2014) explain pure exporters as the exporters with large foreign
demand corresponding to large foreign demand shock in our model.
There is a rich literature on productivity of exporters and non-exporters showing that
exporters are more productive than non-exporters (e.g. Bernard and Jensen, 1999; Bernard
et al., 2003; De Loecker, 2007; Lileeva and Trefler, 2010; and Bustos, 2011). However,
using Chinese firm-level data, Lu (2010) finds that productivity of exporters (value-added
per worker) is lower than productivity of non-exporters while Ma et al. (2014) find the same
pattern in terms of capital labor ratio. Estimating total factor productivity, Defever and
Rian˜o (2012) and Lu et al. (2014) find the productivity of pure exporters is higher than non-
exporters while Dai et al. (2016) find the productivity of processing exporters (which highly
overlap with pure exporters) is lower than productivity of non-exporters. These findings are
compatible with our analysis suggesting that the average productivity of exporters compared
with the average productivity of non-exporters depends on the share of pure exporters, and
the average productivity of pure exporters compared with the average productivity of non-
exporters depends on the entry costs and demand shocks of the markets.
A large and established literature has documented that trade forces the least productive
firms to exit markets leading to increased overall productivity (e.g. Pavcnik, 2002; Melitz,
2003; Trefler, 2004; Bernard et al., 2011; Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008; Mayer et al., 2014).
The finding is compatible with our model provided the distribution of firm characteristics
results in a small share of pure exporters. The paper also contributes to the literature on firm
heterogeneity beyond productivity, e.g. entry costs (Jørgensen and Schro¨der, 2008; Das et
al., 2007; Arkolakis, 2010; Krautheim, 2012; Kasahara and Lapham, 2013). Eaton et al.
(2011) also introduces heterogeneity in entry costs aand demand shocks, but they focus on
the pattern of firm entry and sales across foreign markets. We focus on the choice of which
markets to serve and study the impact of trade on average productivity and firm exit and
entry in the presence of pure exporters.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is the set up of the model. In sec-
tion 3 we describe the equilibrium. In section 4 we explore the effects of trade liberalization.
Section 5 is the supportive evidence of our model. Section 6 is the conclusion.
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2 Set Up
We consider an economy with two identical countries. Labor is the only input factor of firms
and fixed in both countries. Consumers and firms face domestic and foreign market. Firms
pay entry cost whereby they learn their characteristics. Based on these characteristics they
choose to serve the domestic market, foreign market or both markets. Firms have to pay
entry cost to enter domestic or foreign market. There are demand shocks in both markets.
At every date a share of the firms die but the same amount of new firms successfully enter.
There is a dynamic process of firm entry and exit to keep the distribution of firms stationary.
Therefore profit is zero in the equilibrium.
2.1 Commodities
There are labor and a continuum of goods. Let Ω be the set of goods with ω ∈Ω. The price
of labor (wage) is normalized to one.
2.2 Consumers
There is a continuum of identical consumers with mass one in both countries. Every con-
sumer has one unit of labor, that is supplied inelastically, and a CES utility function:
U((q(ω))ω∈Ω) =
(∫
ω∈Ω
[A(ω)q(ω) ]ρ dω
) 1
ρ
with 0 < ρ < 1. For every good ω all consumers in a country have the same demand shock
A(ω), but consumers in different countries can have different demand shocks. In addition,
consumers have shares in firms. However, since there is free entry, average profit of firms is
zero so ownership of firms can be disregarded. The problem of a consumer is to maximize
utility subject to the budget constraint.
Let σ = 1/(1−ρ) so σ > 1 because 0 < ρ < 1. The price index P and the quantity index
Q are defined as follows:
P =
(∫
ω∈Ω
[
p(ω)
A(ω)
]1−σ dω
) 1
1−σ
and Q =
(∫
ω∈Ω
[A(ω)q(ω) ]ρ dω
) 1
ρ
.
The solution to the consumer problem derives the aggregate demand q(ω)ω∈Ω:
q(ω) = A(ω)σ−1 Q
(
p(ω)
P
)−σ
. (1)
Let r(ω) = p(ω)q(ω) for all ω and R = PQ =
∫
ω∈Ω r(ω)dω .
6
2.3 Firms
Firm ω uses labor to produce good ω . Firms face identical entry cost Fe > 0. If a firm enters,
then its cost parameters and demand shocks are revealed. The cost parameters and demand
shocks are (ϕ,Fd,Fx,Ad,Ax) where: ϕ is the productivity; Fd the domestic entry cost; Fx
the foreign entry cost; Ad demand shock in the domestic market; and Ax demand shock in
the foreign market. Therefore a firm is characterized by its productivity, market entry costs
and demand shocks (ϕ,Fd,Fx,Ad,Ax). We assume that the parameters are drawn from a
common probability distribution with density ξ : R5+ → R++ and cumulative distribution
Ξ : R5+→ [0,1].
There is a continuum of active firms. Let Ω be the set of active firms with ω ∈Ω.
Production
Every firm has probability δ > 0 of dying at every date. Let fd = δFd and fx = δFx be
the amortized per date market entry costs. In the sequel we use amortized per date market
entry costs and calculate profit per date rather than market entry costs and expected lifetime
profit. Clearly the density λ : R5+ → R++ on productivity, amortized entry costs and de-
mand shocks is defined by λ (ϕ, fd, fx,Ad,Ax) = ξ (ϕ, fd/δ , fx/δ ,Ad,Ax) with cumulative
distribution Λ(ϕ, fd, fx,Ad,Ax) = Ξ(ϕ, fd/δ , fx/δ ,Ad,Ax).
In order to supply q > 0 units of good ω to the domestic market the firm uses fd +q/ϕ
units of labor. There is a variable export cost τ ≥ 1, so in order to supply q > 0 units of the
good to the export market the firm uses fx+qτ/ϕ units of labor.
There is monopolistic competition in both countries. Therefore for given price and quan-
tity indices, every firm faces the demand function described in (1). A firm supplying the
domestic market maximizes its profit on that market:
max
p
pAσ−1d Q
( p
P
)−σ − 1
ϕ
Aσ−1d Q
( p
P
)−σ
The solution is pd(ϕ) = 1/(ρϕ), the total revenue is rd(P,ϕ,Ad) = R(PAdρϕ)σ−1 and the
profit is pid(P,ϕ, fd,Ad) = rd(P,ϕ,Ad)/σ − fd . A firm supplying the foreign market maxi-
mizes its profit on that market:
max
p
pAσ−1x Q
( p
P
)−σ − τ
ϕ
Aσ−1x Q
( p
P
)−σ
The solution is px(ϕ) = τ/(ρϕ), the total revenue is rx(P,ϕ,Ax) = R(PAxρϕ/τ)σ−1 and the
profit is pix(P,ϕ, fx,Ax) = rx(P,ϕ,Ax)/σ − fx.
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Behavior
Firms can be: non-active firms; non-exporters; ordinary exporters; or, pure exporters. For
every combination of market entry cost and demand shock ( fi,Ai), there is a pair of cut-
off productivities ϕ∗i (P, fi,Ai) with i ∈ {d,x} such that a firm is active in market i if and
only if ϕ ≥ ϕ∗i (P, fi,Ai). The cut-off productivities are determined by pii(P,ϕ∗i , fi,Ai) = 0.
Therefore for Θ= (σ/R)1/(σ−1)/ρ the cut-off productivities are:
ϕ∗d (P, fd,Ad) =
Θ
P
f 1/(σ−1)d
Ad
ϕ∗x (P, fx,Ax) =
τΘ
P
f 1/(σ−1)x
Ax
.
(2)
Hence the behavior of a firm (ϕ, fd, fx,Ad,Ax) can be characterized as follows:
Non-active firm: A firm is non-active provided
ϕ < ϕ∗d (P, fd,Ad) and ϕ < ϕ
∗
x (P, fx,Ax).
Non-exporter: A firm is a non-exporter provided
ϕ∗d (P, fd,Ad) < ϕ < ϕ
∗
x (P, fx,Ax).
Ordinary exporter: A firm is an ordinary exporter provided
ϕ > ϕ∗d (P, fd,Ad) and ϕ > ϕ
∗
x (P, fx,Ax).
Pure exporter: A firm is a pure exporter provided
ϕ∗x (P, fx,Ax) < ϕ < ϕ
∗
d (P, fd,Ad).
Equation (2) shows that cut-off productivities are linear in demand-adjusted market en-
try costs zi = f
1/(σ−1)
i /Ai with i ∈ {d,x}. For a pure exporter, ϕ∗x (P, fx,Ax) < ϕ∗d (P, fd,Ad)
means τzx < zd . Therefore a pure exporters faces lower demand-adjusted foreign entry cost
than demand-adjusted domestic entry cost. Lower demand-adjusted foreign entry cost than
demand-adjusted domestic entry cost has at least two possible sources: relatively low for-
eign entry cost fx < fd or relatively high demand in foreign markets Ax > Ad . Take China
as en example, provinces (and in some cases even cities) compete with other provinces and
build barriers to trade to protect their firms (Young, 2000). Therefore the domestic mar-
ket is quite segmented. As a consequence Chinese firms can face relatively high domestic
entry cost. Moreover firms participating in the global production fragmentation can face
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relatively low foreign entry costs because of their experiences or the networks with foreign
firms. Relatively high demand in foreign markets can happen when they locate in a small or
developing country. If a firm has relatively higher foreign demand than domestic demand,
it may have lower demand-adjusted foreign entry cost than demand-adjusted domestic entry
cost even the foreign entry cost is higher than domestic entry cost. For a pure exporter, its
productivity allows it to earn profit in the foreign market, but not in the domestic market.
It is the reverse for non-exporters. A ordinary exporter earns profit in both domestic and
foreign market given its productivity and a non-active firm cannot make profit in any mar-
ket. Figure 1 illustrates the different kinds of behavior in the demand-adjusted market entry
costs and productivity space. There are two hyperplanes of cut-off productivities defined
by ϕ = ϕ∗d (P, fd,Ad) and ϕ = ϕ
∗
x (P, fx,Ax) as in equation (2). The two planes divide the
space into four parts: non-exporters (NE), ordinary exporters (OE), pure exporters (PE) and
non-active firms (N).
Figure 1: Firm behavior based on market entry costs and demand shocks
Behavior is illustrated in Figure 2 for given demand-adjusted market entry costs: in Fig-
ure 2.a for given demand-adjusted domestic entry cost; and in Figure 2.b for given demand-
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adjusted foreign entry cost. For given demand-adjusted domestic entry cost, pure exporters
are characterized by low productivity and low demand-adjusted foreign entry cost. Indeed
pure exporters have lower productivity than non-exporters. For given demand-adjusted for-
eign entry cost, pure exporters are characterized by higher productivity and demand-adjusted
domestic entry cost than non-exporters. This suggests that pure exporters are different from
ordinary exporters in terms of productivity.
Figure 2: Firm behavior for given demand-adjusted market entry cost
Firm Entry and Exit
At every date a fraction δ of firms die, making the expected profit of entry positive. New
firms enter until the last entrant earns zero profit. Since there is an unlimited amount of
potential entrants, the dead firms are replaced by new firms. Therefore entry and exit do not
affect the distribution of firms.
2.4 Stationary Equilibrium
We consider a stationary equilibrium where all aggregate variables are constant over time.
In equilibrium consumers maximize their utilities, firms maximize their profits and markets
clear. Since there is free entry, the expected lifetime profit of firms is equal to the entry cost.
Let Π be the expected profit per date, then the zero profit condition is:
Π
δ
= Fe. (3)
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3 Equilibrium
There is a unique equilibrium in which all aggregate variables are constant over time.
Theorem 1 There is a unique equilibrium.
Proof: Let η = ( fd, fx,Ad,Ax) to ease notation. For price index P and parameters (ϕ,η) let
pi(P,ϕ,η) be the profit per date. Then the expected profit per date is:
Π(P) =
∫
ϕ,η
pi(P,ϕ,η)λ (ϕ,η)d(ϕ,η) =
∫
η
pi(P |η)λ (η)dη (4)
where λ (η)=
∫
ϕ λ (ϕ,η)dϕ is the marginal density of η and pi(P |η)=
∫
ϕ pi(P,ϕ,η)λ (ϕ |η)dϕ
is expected profit conditional on η . λ (ϕ |η) = λ (ϕ,η)/λ (η) is the distribution of produc-
tivity conditional on η . The profit pi(P,ϕ,η) consists of profit from the domestic market
pid(P,ϕ, fd,Ad) and profit from the foreign market pix(P,ϕ, fx,Ax):
pi(P |η) =
∫ ∞
ϕ∗d (P, fd ,Ad)
pid(P,ϕ, fd,Ad)λ (ϕ |η)dϕ+
∫ ∞
ϕ∗x (P, fx,Ax)
pix(P,ϕ, fx,Ax)λ (ϕ |η)dϕ
(5)
Therefore for Φ : R+→ R+ and k : R+→ R+ defined by
Φ(x) =
(
1
1−Λ(x |η)
∫ ∞
x
ϕσ−1λ (ϕ |η)dϕ
) 1
σ−1
(6)
k(x) = (1−Λ(x |η))
((
Φ(x)
x
)σ−1
−1
)
(7)
where Λ(x |η) is conditional cumulative distribution, the expected profit conditional on η is
pi(P |η) = fdk(ϕ∗d (P, fd,Ad))+ fxk(ϕ∗x (P, fx,Ax)) (8)
Then we prove that Π(P) is an increasing function of P. From equation (6) and (7),
k′(x) = (1−σ)∫ ∞x ϕσ−1λ (ϕ |η)dϕ/xσ < 0. According to Equation (2), the derivatives of
the cut-off productivities with respect to P are negative, i.e. ∂ϕ∗d (P, fd,Ad)/∂P < 0 and
∂ϕ∗x (P, fx,Ax)/∂P < 0. Hence pi ′(P |η)> 0 so Π′(P)> 0. Moreover limP→0Π(P) = 0 and
limP→∞Π(P) = ∞. Thus there is a unique P such that Equation (3) is satisfied. 2
Corollary 1 In equilibrium non-exporters, pure exporters and ordinary exporters co-exist.
Given the distribution λ (ϕ,η) where η = ( fd, fx,Ad,Ax), the firms which can afford
both demand-adjusted domestic and foreign entry costs will become ordinary exporters. The
firms that can only cover demand-adjusted domestic entry cost will become non-exporters,
11
while those that are only able to cover demand-adjusted foreign entry cost will be pure ex-
porters. Pure exporters present due to either relatively lower foreign entry cost than domestic
entry cost and (or) higher foreign demand than domestic demand. Figure 1 has illustrated
all the combinations of parameters for different firm behavior.
Clearly all endogenous variables, including the share of non-exporters, ordinary ex-
porters and pure exporters are determined in equilibrium (See Appendix 1 for full details).
The profit earned by incumbents is equal to the entry cost of the entrants, therefore the total
revenue is equal to the total labor R = L. The total revenue is fixed as the total labor.
Figure 1 shows that some pure exporters have lower productivity than non-exporters.
Whether the average productivity of exporters is higher or lower than the average produc-
tivity of non-exporters depends on the share of pure exporters, which is further determined
by the distribution of firms. In Theorem 2 we show by use of an example that the average
productivity of exporters can be lower than the average productivity of non-exporters.
Theorem 2 Average productivity of exporters, consisting of ordinary exporters and pure
exporters, can be lower than average productivity of non-exporters.
Proof: To quantitatively see that the average productivity of exporters can be lower than
non-exporters, we simplify the calculation by using a specific form of the distribution as
an example. Assume a distribution λ (ϕ,η) such that 1) marginal density distribution of
productivity ϕ is g(ϕ), 2) demand-adjusted foreign entry cost zx is under distribution γ(zx)
and 3) demand-adjusted domestic entry cost zd is under distribution ψ(zd).
As widely used, productivity distribution is Pareto distribution on (ϕ,∞), with density
distribution g(ϕ) = θϕθϕ−θ−1 and cumulative distribution G(ϕ), where ϕ is assumed very
small and θ > 1. We also assume that distribution γ(zx) = βZxβ z
−β−1
x with support on
(Zx,∞) and ψ(zd) = βZdαz−α−1d with support on (Zd,∞), β > 1 and α > 1. Assume τZx <
Zd . These distributions tend to give a high share of pure exporters, thereby more likely
giving lower average productivity of exporters than non-exporters. Then in the equilibrium,
average productivity of exporters and non-exporters are (see appendix 2 for proof):
Ψe =
θ
θ −1
θ +β
θ +β −1
Θ
P
τZx
Ψne =
θ +β
θ +β −1
θ +β +α
θ +β +α−1 ·
Θ
P
Zd
Therefore, the ratio between average productivity of exporters and non-exporters is:
Ψe
Ψne
=
θ
θ −1 ·
θ +β +α−1
θ +β +α
· τZx
Zd
.
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The ratio is an increasing function with τZx/Zd . And we can see:
Ψe
Ψne
< 1 provided
τZx
Zd
<
1+(β +α)/θ
1+(β +α)/(θ −1) < 1.
The share of pure exporters is a decreasing function of the ratio Zx/Zd . The reason is that
the lower Zx/Zd is, the more are firms with relative lower demand-adjusted foreign entry
cost than demand-adjusted domestic entry cost. Therefore there are distributions such that
average productivity of exporters is lower than average productivity of non-exporters. 2
Theorem 2 is surprisingly different from studies that neglect pure exporters. The pro-
ductivity difference between exporters and non-exporters, i.e. productivity premium, is neg-
atively related to the share of pure exporters. The larger the share of pure exporters, the
lower the productivity premium. If the share of pure exporters is sufficiently large, then the
premium will be negative. We provide supportive evidence to these results in the empirical
section.
4 Trade Liberalization
4.1 From Autarky to Trade
In autarky, all firms are non-exporters by definition, therefore foreign entry cost and foreign
demand shock play no role on firms’ profit and cut-off productivity. In order to do com-
parative study between autarky and trade, we firstly prove a unique equilibrium in autarky
and lower price index with trade than in autarky. To see that, the average profit of firms
conditional on η in autarky is determined as:
pi(Pa |η) =
∫ ∞
ϕ∗d (Pa, fd ,Ad)
pid(Pa,ϕ, fd,Ad)λ (ϕ |η)dϕ = fdk(ϕ∗d (Pa, fd,Ad))
where Pa is the price level in autarky. The expected profit in autarky Π(Pa) is :
Π(Pa) =
∫
η
fdk(ϕ∗d (Pa, fd,Ad))λ (η)dη (9)
Since k′(·)< 0 and ϕ∗d (Pa, fd,Ad) is monotonically decreasing with Pa, Π(Pa) is an increas-
ing function. limPa→0Π(Pa) = 0 and limPa→∞Π(Pa) = ∞. Therefore according to equilib-
rium equation (3), there is a unique price level Pa.
The expected profit in autarky Π(Pa) in equation (9) is less than the expected profit with
trade Π(P) determined by equations (4) and (5). Since Π(·) is a monotonically increasing
function, we have P < Pa.
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Because P < Pa, the cut-off productivity for the domestic market in equation (2) become
higher with trade than in autarky. Therefore the plane ϕ∗d (Pa, fd,Ad) is underneath the plane
ϕ∗d (P, fd,Ad) as shown in Figure 3. From Figure 3, we see trade not only forces the low
productive firms with relatively high demand-adjusted foreign entry cost (τzx > zd) out of
the market, as shown in O space, but also induces the less productive firms with relatively
low demand-adjusted foreign entry cost (τzx < zd) into the market as pure exporters, shown
as in PE space. The effect of trade on average productivity can be positive or negative. In
particular, if the share of pure exporters is large, the effect can be negative.
Figure 3: Firm behavior from autarky to trade
Theorem 3 Moving from autarky to trade can lower average productivity.
Proof: Using the same distributions of productivity and demand-adjusted market entry costs
as in the proof in Theorem 2, the average productivities in autarky and trade are (see ap-
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pendix 3 for proof):
Ψa =
θ
θ −1 ·
θ +α
θ +α−1 ·
Θ
Pa
·Zd
Ψ=
θ
θ −1 ·
θ +β
θ +β −1 ·
α(θ−1)
θ+β+α−1Zd(
τZx
Zd
)
θ+β
+βτZx
αθ
θ+β+α (
τZx
Zd
)
θ+β
+β
· Θ
P
Therefore the ratio between overall productivity after trade and autarky is:
Ψ
Ψa
=
θ +β
θ +β −1
θ +α−1
θ +α
α(θ−1)
θ+β+α−1(
τZx
Zd
)
θ+β
+β ( τZxZd )
αθ
θ+β+α (
τZx
Zd
)
θ+β
+β
· Pa
P
It is straightforward that
lim
τZx/Zd→0
Ψ
Ψa
= 0
As τZx/Zd becomes lower, the share of pure exporters becomes higher, leading to lower
overall productivity with trade than in autarky. Because Pa/P is larger than 1, average
productivity after trade can easily be higher than in autarky as the share of pure exporters
decreases. 2
With trade the competition for labor is more intensive than in autarky. Therefore the
real wage is higher with trade than in autarky. As shown in Figure 3, medium produc-
tive firms can afford the new wage and will serve the domestic market solely (NE). High
productive firms will serve both markets (OE). Low productive firms cannot afford demand-
adjusted domestic entry cost because of the high wage. Hence part of them are pushed
out of the market (O), while rest of them are pushed to become pure-exporters because of
low demand-adjusted foreign entry cost (S). Furthermore, some non-active firms with low
demand-adjusted foreign entry cost are induced into the market as pure-exporters (PE). The
effect of moving from autarky to trade on productivity is ambiguous. The outcome depends
on distribution λ (ϕ,η), which determines the portfolio of firms that are pushed out of and
induced into the market. Theorem 3 is a surprise indicating that the impact of trade without
considerations of pure exporters can be misleading.
Theorem 4 Moving from autarky to trade increases welfare.
Proof: Welfare, equal to utility, is defined as:
W =
R
PL
=
1
P
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Welfare in autarky Wa and with trade W are:
Wa =
1
Pa
and W =
1
P
(10)
From the inequality P < Pa, it follows that Wa <W . 2
The effect of trade on the average productivity can be positive or negative, but the welfare
gains from trade is positive. This indicates that the dominant source of trade gains here is
the access to more varieties.
4.2 A Decrease in Foreign Entry Cost
Trade liberalization in form of lower foreign entry cost can be interpreted as a change of the
conditional distribution of foreign entry cost. An example is the enlargement of EU in 2004
that standardized the regulatory environment for a lot of European firms leading to lower
foreign entry cost. Figure 4.a illustrates a possible decrease in foreign entry cost.
Figure 4: Shift of distributions
In order to analyse the effects of a decrease in foreign entry cost, we assume that for
two distributions of characteristics, the conditional distributions of foreign entry cost fx on
(ϕ,Ad,Ax) can be ranked by first-order stochastic dominance:
Lower Foreign Entry Cost (LFEC): For two distributions of characteristics λ and λ ′, λ
has lower foreign entry cost than λ ′ provided Λ( fx |ϕ,Ad,Ax) ≥ Λ′( fx |ϕ,Ad,Ax) for all
(ϕ,η).
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With LFEC, the effects of a decrease in foreign entry cost are summarized as in following
theorem.
Theorem 5 Suppose λ has lower lower foreign entry cost than λ ′. Then a change from
λ ′ to λ forces some pure exporters and non-exporters out of the market and induces some
ordinary exporters to become pure exporters or non-exporters.
Proof: Instead of cut-off productivities ϕ∗i (P, fi,Ai), pii(P,ϕ, fi,Ai) = 0 can alternatively
determine cut-off market entry costs f ∗i (P,ϕ,Ai), i ∈ {d,x}. In particular, f ∗d (P,ϕ,Ad) =
(PAdϕ/Θ)σ−1 and f ∗x (P,ϕ,Ax) = (PAxϕ/(Θτ))
σ−1. Then the firms with market entry cost
lower than the cut-off will serve that market. The profit in the domestic and foreign market
are pid(P,ϕ, fd,Ad) = f ∗d (P,ϕ,Ad)− fd and pix(P,ϕ, fx,Ax) = f ∗x (P,ϕ,Ax)− fx respectively.
Let λ (ϕ,Ad,Ax)=
∫
fd , fx λ (ϕ,η)d( fd, fx) be the marginal distribution and pi(P |ϕ,Ad,Ax)
conditional profit on (ϕ,Ad,Ax), then the expected profit determined as in equation (4) can
be expressed alternatively as
Π(P) =
∫
ϕ,Ad ,Ax
pi(P |ϕ,Ad,Ax)λ (ϕ,Ad,Ax)d(ϕ,Ad,Ax)
Let λ ( fd |ϕ,Ad,Ax) =
∫
fx λ (ϕ,η)d fx/λ (ϕ,Ad,Ax) be the conditional distribution of domes-
tic entry cost on (ϕ,Ad,Ax) and λ ( fx |ϕ,Ad,Ax) =
∫
fd λ (ϕ,η)d fd/λ (ϕ,Ad,Ax) conditional
distribution of foreign entry cost.
pi(P |ϕ,Ad,Ax) =
∫ f ∗d (P,ϕ,Ad)
0
( f ∗d (P,ϕ,Ad)− fd)λ ( fd |ϕ,Ad,Ax)d fd
+
∫ f ∗x (P,ϕ,Ax)
0
( f ∗x (P,ϕ,Ax)− fx)λ ( fx |ϕ,Ad,Ax)d fx
Here a decrease in foreign entry cost will shift conditional distribution λ ( fx |ϕ,Ad,Ax)while
leaving λ ( fd |ϕ,Ad,Ax) and λ (ϕ,Ad,Ax) unchanged. With property LFEC, the decrease of
foreign entry cost will increase the conditional profit pi(P |ϕ,Ad,Ax) (See Appendix 4). As
a result, Π(P) is higher. We have shown that Π(P) is an monotonically increasing function.
Therefore price level P is decreased, leading to higher cut-off productivity for both domestic
and foreign market. As shown in Figure 5, among firms for any given combination of
demand-adjusted domestic and foreign entry cost, the least productive firms (pure exporters
or non-exporters) are pushed out of the market, while the least productive ordinary exporters
become pure exporters or non-exporters. 2
A decrease in foreign entry cost across firms raises average profit and intensifies the
competition for labor. Hence real wage is increased. As a result, some low productive non-
exporters and pure exporters are pushed out of the market and some ordinary exporters are
pushed out of the non-profitable market. After a decrease in foreign entry cost, average
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productivity is increased as some low productive firms are pushed out of the market. Mean-
while, according to equation (10), welfare is improved because price level P is decreased.
We also find that innovation in form of higher productivity across firms has the same
effects as a decrease of foreign entry cost in Theorem 5 (See appendix 5). Innovation can
be interpreted as a change of the conditional distribution of productivity. An example is the
digitalization starting in the 1980s. Figure 4.b illustrates a possible increase in productivity.
Innovation will increase the average productivity of incumbents and increase the average
profit, thereby intensifying the competition for labor. Real wage is increased as well. There-
fore the effects are the same with a decrease in foreign entry cost.
Figure 5: A decrease in foreign entry cost
4.3 A Decrease in Variable Export Cost
In this part, we study the effects of a decrease in variable export cost. The effects are
summarized in the following theorem.
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Theorem 6 A decrease in the variable export cost forces some non-exporters out of the
market or to become ordinary exporters and induces some non-active firms and ordinary
exporters to become pure exporters.
Proof: As variable export cost τ is decreased, the profit from the foreign market pix(P,ϕ, fx,Ax)
is increased. Therefore conditional profit pi(P |η) in equation (5) is increased. It is followed
that Π(P) is increased. We have shown that Π(P) is an monotonically increasing function.
Hence price index is decreased. This raises cut-off productivity in the domestic market to
pushes some non-exporters out of the market and some ordinary exporters to become pure
exporters.
To see the effect of τ on cut-off productivity of the foreign market, we assume r = P/τ ,
equation (2) becomes ϕ∗d (P, fd,Ad)=ϕ
∗
d (r, fd,Ad)=Θ/(rτ)· f 1/(σ−1)d /Ad and ϕ∗x (P, fx,Ax)=
ϕ∗x (r, fx,Ax) =Θ/r · f 1/(σ−1)x /Ax. Equilibrium determination (3) can be written as Π(r,τ) =
Feδ . Hence we have dr/dτ =−(∂Π(r,τ)/∂τ)/(∂Π(r,τ)/∂ r).
Equation (8) becomes a function of r, pi(P |η) = pi(r,τ |η). Therefore, we have
∂pi(r,τ |η)
∂τ
= fdk′(·)
∂ϕ∗d (r, fd,Ad)
∂τ
> 0
∂pi(r,τ |η)
∂ r
= fdk′(·)
∂ϕ∗d (r, fd,Ad)
∂ r
+ fxk′(·)∂ϕ
∗
x (r, fx,Ax)
∂ r
> 0
Hence ∂Π(r,τ)/∂τ > 0 and ∂Π(r,τ)/∂ r > 0. We have dr/dτ < 0. Therefore, the cut-off
productivity of the foreign market is decreased by a decrease in variable export cost, pushing
some non-active firms to be pure exporters and some non-exporters to be ordinary exporters.
2
A decrease in variable export cost will make firms that serve the foreign market get
more profit, thereby increasing the demand for labor. The real wage will be higher. As
shown in Figure 6, the plane of cut-off productivity for the domestic market is shifted up.
Therefore, some low productive non-exporters are pushed out of the market and become
non-active. Low productive ordinary exporters with relative low demand-adjusted foreign
entry cost become pure exporters. However, even though the real wage is higher, the ex-
porters still benefit from a lower variable export cost. The plane of cut-off productivity to
export becomes lower to induce more firms to export. In particular, the low productive firms
with relative low demand-adjusted foreign entry cost, which are otherwise non-active, will
become pure exporters.
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Figure 6: A decrease in variable export cost
5 Empirical Evidence
In this section, we provide the supportive evidence of our model. We firstly present the ob-
servation of pervasive existence of pure exporters across countries. Secondly, we document
the non-trivial roles of pure exporters in economies. Thirdly, we estimate the total factor
productivity of Chinese firms and show that pure exporters have lower productivity than
non-exporters and ordinary exporters have higher productivity than non-exporters. Finally,
we show that the productivity premium of exporters, i.e. productivity difference between
exporters and non-exporters, can be negative and is negatively related to the share of pure
exporters as predicted by our model.
20
5.1 Pervasive Existence
Pure exporters account for a large share of firms in a large number of countries. As in
Defever and Rian˜o (2012), pure exporters are defined as exporters that sell more than 90%
of their gross sales in foreign markets. We use the World Bank enterprise surveys in 135
countries to calculate the share of pure exporters in all firms and the share of pure exporters
in all exporters. The results are shown in Figure 7. Pure exporters account for at least 7%
of all firms in more than 25% of the countries. Moreover, pure exporters account for at least
19% of all exporters in more than 50% of the countries, and account for at least 10% of all
exporters in more than 75% of the countries.
In our model pure exporters co-exist with ordinary exporters and non-exporters. More-
over, the share of pure exporters depends on the distribution of firms. Therefore different
distributions of firms across countries generate different shares of pure exporters.
5.2 Non-trivial Roles
We use data on Chinese annual survey of manufacturing firms to calculate the share of total
exports, gross sales, employment and asset for pure exporters. The Chinese annual sur-
vey of manufacturing firms is collected by the National Bureau of Statistics of China. The
survey covers all state-owned firms and firms of other ownership with sales above RMB 5
million (above-scale firms) (Previous studies exploiting this database include Yu (2015) and
Manova and Yu (2016).). The survey records firm production data, including employment,
total wage, capital, intermediate input, sales, export and etc. The survey also records fi-
nancial variables of firms, e.g. asset, debt and cash flow. Moreover, the survey reports the
information about firm location, ownership and the sector that the firm operates within as
well.
The descriptive statistics of pure exporters are shown in Table 1. Pure exporters account
for a large share of total exports, and a non-trivial share of gross sales, employment and
asset. In China, 11% of all firms and 40% of exporters are pure exporters. Pure exporters
export 53% of total exports. Moreover, the average exports of pure exporters are l.65 times
of the average exports of ordinary exporters. Pure exporters account for 22% of gross sales,
33% of total employment, 14% of fixed asset and 15% of total asset of all exporters.
5.3 Productivity Performance
In our model, we allow the productivity of pure exporters to be lower than non-exporters
(see Figure 2.a). To verify this point, we estimate the total factor productivity of Chinese
firms and find that pure exporters have lower productivity than non-exporters and ordinary
exporters have higher than non-exporters.
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Note: The data is from World Bank Enterprise Surveys, which offers an expansive array of eco-
nomic data on 130,000 firms in 135 countries. More than 90% of the countries are developing
countries. As in Defever and Rian˜o (2012), pure exporters are defined as exporters that export more
than 90% of their gross sales. The figure shows that a large share of pure exporters exist in a wide
range of countries. In particular, pure exporters account at least 7% of all firms in more than 25%
of the countries, and account at least 19% (10%) of all exporters in more than 50% (75%) of the
countries.
Figure 7: Percentage of pure exporters across countries
To estimate the productivity of firms, we assume the production function as:
lnY jit = κ
j
0 +κ
j
1 lnL
j
it +κ
j
2 lnK
j
it +κ
j
3 lnM
j
it + lnϕ
j
it
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of pure exporters
Variable Share/ratio 2002 2003 2005 2006 2007 Average
Number Share in all firms 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.11
Share in all exporters 0.40 0.42 0.40 0.39 0.41 0.40
Exports Share in all firms 0.51 0.54 0.53 0.53 0.52 0.53
Ratio to ordinary exporters 1.61 1.61 1.69 1.74 1.58 1.65
Gross sales Share in all firms 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.12
Share in all exporters 0.20 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.22
Ratio to ordinary exporters 0.39 0.39 0.44 0.47 0.44 0.43
Employment Share in all firms 0.13 0.16 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.17
Share in all exporters 0.28 0.32 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.33
Ratio to ordinary exporters 0.60 0.66 0.82 0.84 0.79 0.74
Fixed asset Share in all firms 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.08
Share in all exporters 0.12 0.13 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.14
Ratio to ordinary exporters 0.20 0.20 0.28 0.27 0.27 0.24
Total asset Share in all firms 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08
Share in all exporters 0.13 0.14 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.15
Ratio to ordinary exporters 0.22 0.22 0.29 0.30 0.28 0.26
Notes: Source from China Industrial Firm-level database which covers manufacturing firms with
sales more than 5 million RMB and accounts for more than 90% of Chinese industrial output. Ratio
is calculated as the average value of a variable of all pure exporters divided by the average value of
the variable of all ordinary exporters. We do not include data of year 2004 as some data is missing
in our database.
where lnY jit , lnL
j
it , lnK
j
it , lnM
j
it and lnϕ
j
it are the logarithms of output, labor, capital, mate-
rial and total factor productivity of firm i in industry j at year t. To estimate the equation,
we adopt the Olley and Pakes (1996) approach using investment to control the unobserv-
able productivity. Following previous studies, such as Amiti and Konings (2007) and Yu
(2015), the investment function is revised by adding a dummy for exporter. As the robust-
ness checks, we also add dummies of pure exporters and state-owned firms to the investment
function. We also estimate the value-added function with Olley and Pakes (1996) approach
and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) approach to calculate the productivity for the robustness
checks. We use industry-wide price index as in Brandt et al. (2012) to deflate the output,
capital, investment and material for all the regressions. The details of estimation methods
are described in the appendix 6.
After estimating the productivity, we use the following equation to test productivity
performance of pure exporters compared with ordinary exporters and non-exporters:
lnϕ jit = α+α1PE
j
it +α2OE
j
it +α3Size
j
it + ς j + ςt + ε
j
it (11)
where PE jit and OE
j
it are dummies. PE
j
it takes value of one if the firm is a pure exporter
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while OE jit takes the value of one if the firm is an ordinary exporter. ς j and ςt are industry
and year fixed effects. As shown in Bernard and Jensen (1999) and Bernard et al. (2012), the
correlation between firm size and exporting partially accounts for the differences between
exporters and non-exporters. Therefore, we add firm size Size jit measured by logarithm of
labor into the regression.
The results with the productivity estimated from revenue function with Olley and Pakes
(1996) approach are shown in Table 2. Column (1) uses the sample of ordinary exporters and
non-exporters while column (2) uses the sample of pure exporters and non-exporters. We see
that the productivity of ordinary exporters is higher than productivity of non-exporters and
the productivity of pure exporters is lower than the productivity of non-exporters. Columns
(3)-(6) use the whole sample to estimate equation (11). As shown in column (4) without con-
trolling for firm size, the productivity of pure exporters is 2.2% lower than non-exporters
and the productivity of ordinary exporters is 0.7% higher than non-exporters. After con-
trolling for firm size in column (6), the productivity of pure exporters is 1.7% lower than
non-exporters and the productivity of ordinary exporters is 1.2% higher than non-exporters.
Table 2: Productivity performance of pure exporters
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
lnϕ jit lnϕ
j
it lnϕ
j
it lnϕ
j
it lnϕ
j
it lnϕ
j
it
OE 0.014 0.039 0.007 0.046 0.012
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)***
PE -0.018 0.069 -0.022 0.075 -0.017
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)***
Size -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.007
(0.0003)*** (0.0004)*** (0.0004)*** (0.0003)***
Time YES YES NO YES NO YES
Industry YES YES NO YES NO YES
# obs. 970,457 909,058 1,096,423 1,096,423 1,096,423 1,096,423
PE and OE are dummy variables which take the value of one if the firm is a pure exporter and ordinary
exporter respectively. Pure exporters are defined as exporters that sell more than 90% of their gross
sales in foreign markets. Standard errors are stated in parentheses below point estimates. ***, ** and
* mean 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively.
We report the robustness checks for alternative definitions of pure exporters in Table 3.
Pure exporters are defined as exporters that export more than 95% of gross sales in columns
(1) and (2), as exporters that export more than 99% of gross sales in columns (3) and (4)
and exporters that export 100% of gross sales in columns (5) and (6). The results are very
consistent with the main results in Table 2. When controlling for firm size, the productivity
of pure exporters is 1.6-1.7% lower than non-exporters and the productivity of ordinary
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exporters is 0.7-1.0% higher than non-exporters.
Table 3: Robustness checks for alternative definitions of pure exporters
95% of gross sales 99% of gross sales 100% of gross sales
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
lnϕ jit lnϕ
j
it lnϕ
j
it lnϕ
j
it lnϕ
j
it lnϕ
j
it
OE 0.005 0.010 0.003 0.008 0.002 0.007
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)***
PE -0.021 -0.017 -0.021 -0.016 -0.021 -0.017
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)***
Size -0.007 -0.007 -0.007
(0.0003)*** (0.0003)*** (0.0003)***
Time YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry YES YES YES YES YES YES
# obs. 1,096,423 1,096,423 1,096,423 1,096,423 1,096,423 1,096,423
PE and OE are dummy variables which take the value of one if the firm is a pure exporter and ordinary
exporter respectively. Pure exporters are defined as exporters that export more than 95% of gross
sales in columns (1) and (2), as exporters that export more than 99% of gross sales in columns (3)
and (4) and exporters that export 100% of gross sales in columns (5) and (6). Standard errors are
stated in parentheses below point estimates. ***, ** and * mean 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels
respectively.
We also report the robustness checks for alternative productivity estimations in Table 4.
In column (1) and (2) we use the productivity estimated from revenue function with Olley
and Pakes (1996) approach, in which more controls, i.e. dummies of exporters, pure ex-
porters and state-owned firms, are added in the investment function. The results are very
consistent with the main results shown in Table 2. In column (3), (4), (5) and (6), we use
productivity estimated from value-added function with Olley and Pakes (1996) approach.
More specifically, in (3) and (4), dummy of exporter is added into investment function while
in in (5) and (6) more controls are added. When controlling for firm size, the productivity
of pure exporters is 9.8-14.7% lower than non-exporters while the productivity of ordinary
exporters is 13.2-17.9% higher than non-exporters. In column (7) and (8), we are using
the productivity estimated from value-added function with Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) ap-
proach. The results are very consistent that, the productivity of pure exporters (ordinary ex-
porters) is 11.9% lower (16.7% higher) than non-exporters. With estimations of value-added
function, the productivity performance of pure exporters compared with ordinary exporters
and non-exporters are consistent with estimations of revenue function. The productivity
difference with estimations of value-added function is even larger than the estimations of
revenue function.
To investigate the productivity performance of pure exporters by sectors, we estimate the
equation (11) for every sector. As shown in Figure 8, the results are very consistent between
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Table 4: Robustness checks for alternative productivity estimations
OP revenue 2 OP valueadded 1 OP valueadded 2 LP valueadded
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
lnϕ jit lnϕ
j
it lnϕ
j
it lnϕ
j
it lnϕ
j
it lnϕ
j
it lnϕ
j
it lnϕ
j
it
OE 0.038 0.022 0.186 0.132 0.335 0.179 0.522 0.167
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)***
PE -0.008 -0.021 -0.051 -0.098 -0.012 -0.147 0.188 -0.119
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.003)***
Size 0.021 0.076 0.218 0.496
(0.0003)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)***
Time YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
# obs. 1,088,485 1,088,485 1,052,000 1,052,000 1,048,985 1,048,985 1,052,824 1,052,824
PE and OE are dummy variables which take the value of one if the firm is a pure exporter and ordinary exporter
respectively. Pure exporters are defined as exporters that export more than 90% of their gross sales. OP revenue 2
means estimation of revenue function with Olley and Pakes (1996) approach, in which more controls, i.e. dummies
of exporters, pure exporters and state-owned firms, are added in the investment function. OP valueadded 1 means
estimation of value-added function with Olley and Pakes (1996) approach in which dummy of exporter is added in
the investment function. OP valueadded 2 means estimation of value-added function with Olley and Pakes (1996)
approach in which more controls are added in the investment function. LP valueadded means the estimation of value-
added function with Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) approach. Standard errors are stated in parentheses below point
estimates. ***, ** and * mean 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively.
estimations controlling for firm size and estimations without controlling for firm size. The
coefficients lie generally in the 45 degree line. In particular, out of 27 sectors, pure exporters
have lower productivity than non-exporters in 21 (24) sectors with the estimations control-
ling (without controlling) for firm size. The robustness checks with alternative productivity
estimations are reported in Figure 9. With the productivity estimated from revenue function
with Olley and Pakes (1996) approach in which more controls are added in the investment
function, the productivity of pure exporters is lower than non-exporters in 22 sectors when
controlling for firm size. With the productivity estimated from value-added function with
Olley and Pakes (1996) approach, the productivity of pure exporters is lower than non-
exporters in 20 sectors and 23 sectors respectively. With the productivity estimated from
value-added function with Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), the productivity of pure exporters
is lower than non-exporters in 23 sectors.
We have shown that in general pure exporters have lower productivity than non-exporters
and ordinary exporters have higher productivity than non-exporters. This pattern holds with
variations for alternative definitions of pure exporters and alternative productivity estima-
tions. Though the pattern does not hold in all sectors, it holds in most of the sectors. Our
model is consistent with this pattern. In our model, the productivity of pure exporters can
be lower or higher than productivity of non-exporters.
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Note: As in Yu (2015), the Chinese sectors are classified as: processing of foods (13), manufac-
ture of foods (14), beverages (15), textiles (17), apparel (18), leather (19), timber (20), furniture
(21), paper (22), printing (23), articles for cultures and sports (24), raw chemicals (26), medicines
(27), chemical fibres (28), rubber (29), plastics (30), non-metallic minerals (31), smelting of ferrous
metals (32), smelting of non-ferrous metals (33), metal (34), general machinery (35), special ma-
chinery (36), transport equipment (37), electrical machinery (39), communication equipment (40),
measuring instruments (41) and manufacture of artwork (42).
Figure 8: Productivity performance of pure exporters across sectors
5.4 Productivity Premium of Exporters
In Theorem 2, our model predicts that the average productivity of exporters can be lower
than the average productivity of non-exporters, i.e. the productivity premium of exporters
can be negative. Moreover, our model suggests whether and to what extent the average
productivity of exporters is lower than the average productivity of non-exporters depend
on the share of pure exporters. In this section, we provide the evidence that productivity
premium of exporters can be negative and productivity premium of exporters is lower in the
sector with larger share of pure exporters.
To study if there is negative productivity premium of exporters, we estimate the follow-
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Note: OP revenue 2 means estimation of revenue function with Olley and Pakes (1996) approach,
in which more controls, i.e. dummies of exporters, pure exporters and state-owned firms, are added
in the investment function. OP valueadded 1 means estimation of value-added function with Ol-
ley and Pakes (1996) approach in which dummy of exporter is added in the investment function.
OP valueadded 2 means estimation of value-added function with Olley and Pakes (1996) approach
in which more controls are added in the investment function. LP valueadded means the estimation
of value-added function with Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) approach.
Figure 9: Robustness on the productivity performance of pure exporters across sectors
ing equation for every sector:
lnϕit = α+α1EXit +α2Sizeit + ςt + εit
where EXit is the dummy variable that takes value of one if the firm i at year t is an exporter.
The results are shown in Table 5. The results with time fixed effects and without control-
ling for firm size suggest that 18 out of 27 sectors have negative productivity premium of
exporters. The negative premium is statistically significant in 15 sectors. Controlling for the
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firm size, negative productivity premium exists in 16 sectors and is statistically significant in
11 sectors. As a comparison, positive productivity premium is significant in 9 sectors. The
simple average of coefficients across the 11 sectors with significantly negative productivity
premium is -0.02, indicating that exporters have 2% lower productivity than non-exporters
in average. The results with alternative productivity estimations are very consistent. In par-
ticular, for the four alternative productivity estimations, in average 10 sectors have negative
productivity premium of exporters (refer to Figure 11 for details).
We have shown that productivity premium of exporters is significantly negative in almost
half of the sectors. To investigate whether the premium is negatively related to the share of
pure exporters, we firstly plot the coefficients of the exporter dummy EXit in last column
of Table 5 and the shares of pure exporters of corresponding sectors. As shown in Figure
10, the productivity premium of exporters is smaller in the sector with larger share of pure
exporters in all firms. The productivity premium of exporters tends to be negative given a
large share of pure exporters. This pattern holds if we use the share of pure exporters in
all exporters. It suggests that the productivity premium of exporters is negatively related to
share of pure exporters. The robustness checks with alternative productivity estimations are
reported in Figure 11. For all alternative productivity estimations, the premium is smaller
when the share of pure exporters is larger and the premium tends to be negative when the
share is large.
Furthermore, we estimate the following equation to test the negative relationship be-
tween productivity premium of exporters and share of pure exporters:
lnϕ jit = α+α1EX
j
it +α2EX
j
it × share jt +α3share jt +α4Size jit + ς j + ςt + ε jit
where share jt is the share of pure exporters in all firms of sector j at year t. The coefficient
α2 of the interaction term EX
j
it × share jt measures the relationship between productivity
premium of exporters and share of pure exporters. If it is negative, it means that in the
sector with larger share of pure exporters, the productivity premium of exporters is lower.
We also use the share of pure exporters in all exporters to check the robustness.
The results are shown in Table 6. As shown in column (1), in general the productiv-
ity of exporters is slightly higher than non-exporters. From column (2) to column (6), the
coefficients of interaction term are all significantly negative, which means that the produc-
tivity premium of exporters is negatively related to the share of pure exporters. As shown
in column (6), if there are no pure exporters, the productivity of exporters is 1.2% higher
than non-exporters. However, when the share of pure exporters in all firms is increased by
1%, the premium is decreased by 0.083%. This suggests that if the share of pure exporters
in all firms is larger than 14.5%, the productivity premium of exporters will be negative.
As shown in column (7) and (8), the results are very consistent when we use the share of
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Table 5: Productivity premium of exporters across sectors
EX EX EX
Sector Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
13 -0.019 (0.004)*** -0.023 (0.004)*** -0.018 (0.004)***
14 0.011 (0.005)** 0.011 (0.005)** 0.006 (0.005)
15 0.040 (0.009)*** 0.042 (0.009)*** 0.046 (0.009)***
17 -0.021 (0.002)*** -0.013 (0.002)*** -0.007 (0.002)***
18 -0.025 (0.003)*** -0.010 (0.002)*** -0.009 (0.003)***
19 -0.018 (0.003)*** -0.010 (0.003)*** -0.018 (0.003)***
20 -0.063 (0.006)*** -0.042 (0.005)*** -0.038 (0.005)***
21 -0.016 (0.006)** -0.028 (0.005)*** -0.018 (0.006)***
22 0.024 (0.005)*** 0.020 (0.005)*** 0.029 (0.005)***
23 -0.001 (0.008) -0.029 (0.007)*** -0.004 (0.007)
24 -0.017 (0.005)*** -0.002 (0.004) -0.007 (0.005)
25 0.053 (0.017)*** 0.038 (0.016)** 0.049 (0.017)***
26 0.036 (0.003)*** 0.040 (0.003)*** 0.042 (0.003)***
27 0.045 (0.007)*** 0.048 (0.007)*** 0.043 (0.007)***
28 -0.005 (0.008) 0.000 (0.008) 0.015 (0.008)*
29 -0.022 (0.007)*** -0.022 (0.006)*** -0.011 (0.007)
30 -0.025 (0.003)*** -0.018 (0.003)*** -0.002 (0.003)
31 0.052 (0.003)*** 0.042 (0.003)*** 0.041 (0.003)***
32 0.017 (0.006)*** 0.019 (0.006)*** 0.024 (0.007)***
33 0.004 (0.006) -0.012 (0.006)** 0.003 (0.006)
34 -0.027 (0.003)*** -0.024 (0.003)*** -0.015 (0.003)***
35 -0.009 (0.003)*** -0.003 (0.003) 0.000 (0.003)
36 0.012 (0.004)*** 0.004 (0.004) 0.017 (0.004)***
37 -0.030 (0.004)*** -0.033 (0.004)*** -0.019 (0.004)***
39 -0.040 (0.003)*** -0.040 (0.003)*** -0.036 (0.003)***
40 0.057 (0.004)*** -0.001 (0.004) -0.004 (0.004)
41 -0.055 (0.007)*** -0.028 (0.007)*** -0.028 (0.007)***
42 -0.022 (0.004)*** -0.022 (0.004)*** -0.019 (0.004)***
Time NO YES YES
Firm size NO NO YES
Columns Coef. are the coefficients of dummy variable EX which take the value of
one if the firm is an exporter. Standard errors are stated in columns Std. Err.. ***,
** and * mean 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively.
pure exporters in all exporters. The result in column (8) suggests that, if the share of pure
exporters in all exporters is larger than 38.75%, the productivity premium will be negative.
The robustness checks on productivity premium for alternative definitions of pure ex-
porters are reported in Table 7. The results are quantitatively robust. The robustness checks
for alternative productivity estimations are reported in Table 8. All the results show that
the larger the share of pure exporters is, the lower is the productivity premium of exporters.
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Figure 10: Productivity premium of exporters and the share of pure exporters
Across the estimations, the productivity premium of exporters will be negative if the share
of pure exporters in all firms is larger than 19.14-20.80% or if the share of pure exporters in
all exporters is larger than 43.96-45.39%.
6 Conclusion
In the present paper we have studied what pushes firms to become pure exporters, ordinary
exporters and non-exporters. We have also investigated the impacts of trade on average
productivity and welfare (Theorems 3 and 4) and how trade liberalization pushes firms to
change the markets they serve (Theorems 5 and 6) in the presence of pure exporters. Two
important findings were that the average productivity of exporters consisting of pure ex-
porters and ordinary exporters can be lower than productivity of non-exporters (Theorem 2)
depending on the share of pure exporters and that moving from autarky to trade can lower
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Figure 11: Robustness checks on the productivity premium of exporters
average productivity (Theorem 3). Despite the ambiguous effect of moving from autarky to
trade on productivity, such a move leads to higher welfare because the variety of goods goes
up (Theorem 4).
We provide the supportive evidence of our model. Firstly, we present the pervasive exis-
tence and non-trivial roles of pure exporters. Then, we estimate the total factor productivity
of Chinese firms and show that pure exporters have lower productivity than non-exporters
and ordinary exporters have higher productivity than non-exporters. Finally, we show that
the productivity premium of exporters, i.e. productivity difference between exporters and
non-exporters, is negative in almost half of the sectors and is negatively related to the share
of pure exporters.
In the paper there are no processing firms producing inputs or goods for other firms and
there is monopolistic competition between firms. In order to enrich our understanding of
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Table 6: Results on the productivity premium of exporters and the share of pure exporters
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
lnϕ jit lnϕ
j
it lnϕ
j
it lnϕ
j
it lnϕ
j
it lnϕ
j
it lnϕ
j
it lnϕ
j
it
EX 0.001 0.045 0.041 0.008 0.007 0.012 0.026 0.031
(0.001)* (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)***
EX × share -0.342 -0.304 -0.103 -0.082 -0.083
(0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)***
Share 0.856 0.857 -0.045 0.440 0.441
(0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.018)** (0.019)*** (0.019)***
EX × share 2 -0.078 -0.080
(0.005)*** (0.005)***
Share 2 -0.459 -0.463
(0.013)*** (0.013)***
Firm size -0.007 -0.007 -0.007
(0.0003)*** (0.0003)*** (0.0003)***
Time YES NO YES NO YES YES YES YES
Industry YES NO NO YES YES YES YES YES
# obs. 1,096,423 1,096,423 1,096,423 1,096,423 1,096,423 1,096,423 1,096,423 1,096,423
Share is the share of pure exporters in all firms while share 2 is the share of pure exporters in all exporters. Standard errors
are stated in parentheses below point estimates. ***, ** and * mean 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively.
pure exporters or exporters with high export intensity, it would be interesting to allow firms
to become processing plants for other firms, thereby lowering their market entry cost in
possibly more competitive markets.
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Table 7: Robustness checks on productivity premium for alternative definitions of pure exporters
95% of gross sales 99% of gross sales 100% of gross sales
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
lnϕ jit lnϕ
j
it lnϕ
j
it lnϕ
j
it lnϕ
j
it lnϕ
j
it
EX 0.011 0.028 0.010 0.025 0.010 0.023
(0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)***
EX × share -0.083 -0.089 -0.092
(0.007)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)***
Share 0.353 0.287 0.207
(0.0120)*** (0.023)*** (0.024)***
EX × share 2 -0.080 -0.084 -0.087
(0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.006)***
Share 2 -0.562 -0.592 -0.615
(0.014)*** (0.014)*** (0.015)***
Firm size -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007
(0.0003)*** (0.0003)*** (0.0003)*** (0.0003)*** (0.0003)*** (0.0003)***
Time YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry YES YES YES YES YES YES
# obs. 1,096,423 1,096,423 1,096,423 1,096,423 1,096,423 1,096,423
Share is the share of pure exporters in all firms while share 2 is the share of pure exporters in exporters.
Pure exporters are defined as exporters that export more than 95% of gross sales in columns (1) and (2), as
exporters that export more than 99% of gross sales in columns (3) and (4) and exporters that export 100%
of gross sales in columns (5) and (6). Standard errors are stated in parentheses below point estimates. ***,
** and * mean 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively.
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Table 8: Robustness checks on productivity premium for alternative productivity estimations
OP revenue 2 OP valueadded 1 OP valueadded 2 LP valueadded
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
lnϕ jit lnϕ
j
it lnϕ
j
it lnϕ
j
it lnϕ
j
it lnϕ
j
it lnϕ
j
it lnϕ
j
it
EX 0.018 0.040 0.141 0.270 0.167 0.336 0.167 0.325
(0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.004)*** (0.006)*** (0.004)*** (0.006)*** (0.004)*** (0.006)***
EX × share -0.094 -0.716 -0.821 -0.803
(0.006)*** (0.019)*** (0.020)*** (0.019)***
Share 0.479 1.622 1.638 1.655
(0.019)*** (0.057)*** (0.058)*** (0.057)***
EX × share 2 -0.091 -0.605 -0.751 -0.716
(0.005)*** (0.014)*** (0.015)*** (0.014)***
Share 2 -0.436 -0.700 -0.672 -0.711
(0.013)*** (0.040)*** (0.041)*** (0.041)***
Firm size 0.021 0.021 0.077 0.077 0.220 0.219 0.498 0.497
(0.0003)*** (0.0003)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)***
Time YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
# obs. 1,088,485 1,088,485 1,052,000 1,052,000 1,048,985 1,048,985 1,052,824 1,052,824
Share is the share of pure exporters in all firms while share 2 is the share of pure exporters in exporters. OP revenue 2 means
estimation of revenue function with Olley and Pakes (1996) approach, in which more controls, i.e. dummies of exporters,
pure exporters and state-owned firms, are added in the investment function. OP valueadded 1 means estimation of value-
added function with Olley and Pakes (1996) approach in which dummy of exporter is added in the investment function.
OP valueadded 2 means estimation of value-added function with Olley and Pakes (1996) approach in which more controls
are added in the investment function. LP valueadded means the estimation of value-added function with Levinsohn and Petrin
(2003) approach. Standard errors are stated in parentheses below point estimates. ***, ** and * mean 1%, 5% and 10%
significance levels respectively.
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Appendix
Appendix 1: All variables in the equilibrium
Let ϒ be the probability of an entrant becoming active, then
ϒ=
∫
η
∫
ϕ∗(η)
λ (ϕ,η)d(ϕ,η)
where ϕ∗(η) = min{ϕ∗d (P, fd,Ad),ϕ∗x (P, fx,Ax)}. For ( fi,Ai), zi = f 1/(σ−1)i /Ai. It follows
from equation (2) that ϕ∗(η) = ϕ∗d (P, fd,Ad) if zd < τzx and ϕ
∗(η) = ϕ∗x (P, fx,Ax) if zd >
τzx.
Let Πp be the average profit earned by incumbents. In equilibrium we use Π to de-
note the expected profit per date, so Π should be equal to the profit earned conditional on
successful entry, i.e. Π= ϒΠp.
Let Me denote the amount of entrants and M the amount of incumbents. Since successful
entrants will replace the dead firms, we have Mδ = Meϒ. Labor L is used for production
by incumbents Lp and investment by entrants Le. The labor for entrants is Le = MeFe. With
equation (3), we have
Le = MeFe =
δM
ϒ
Π
δ
= M
Π
ϒ
= MΠp
MΠp is the total profit eared by all incumbents, therefore we have R = Lp +MΠp = Lp +
Le = L. Total revenue is fixed as the total labor. Let r¯ and f¯ be the average revenue and
fixed cost of incumbents respectively. Then Πp = r¯/σ − f¯ . It follows that r¯ = σ(Πp+ f¯ ) =
σ(δFe/ϒ+ f¯ ). With ϒ, we can also denote the distribution of incumbents as λ (ϕ,η)/ϒ. f¯
is the average market entry cost of incumbents,
f¯ =
∫
η
∫
ϕ∗d (P, fd ,Ad)
fd
λ (ϕ,η)
ϒ
d(ϕ,η)+
∫
η
∫
ϕ∗x (P, fx,Ax)
fx
λ (ϕ,η)
ϒ
d(ϕ,η)
In equilibrium, we have found the price index and cut-off productivities. So ϒ and f¯ are
known. Then the amount of incumbents M can be determined by:
M =
R
r¯
=
L
σ(δFe/ϒ+ f¯ )
Appendix 1.1 contains an alternative route to above equation using labor market.
Let the Sd denote the area {η |zd < τzx} and Sx the area {η |zd > τzx}. Non-exporters
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are located in the Sd area and the amount is determined by:
Mne = M
∫
Sd
∫ ϕ∗x (P, fx,Ax)
ϕ∗d (P, fd ,Ad)
λ (ϕ,η)
ϒ
d(ϕ,η)
Pure exporters are located in Sx area and amount of pure exporters is determined by:
Mpe = M
∫
Sx
∫ ϕ∗d (P, fd ,Ad)
ϕ∗x (P, fx,Ax)
λ (ϕ,η)
ϒ
d(ϕ,η)
Then the share of pure exporters is determined as Mpe/M.
Appendix 1.1: An alternative way to find number of incumbents M
For a firm (ϕ, fd, fx,Ad,Ax), let q be the output in the domestic market, labor used to serve
the domestic market is fd + q/ϕ = fd +ρ p(ϕ)q = fd +σρ(pid(P,ϕ, fd,Ad)+ fd) = (σ −
1)pid(P,ϕ, fd,Ad)+σ fd . By analogy, the labor used to export is (σ − 1)pix(P,ϕ, fx,Ax)+
σ fx.
With ϒ, the distribution of incumbents is λ (ϕ,η)/ϒ. Then the total labor for incumbents
Lp is
Lp = M
∫
η
∫ ∞
ϕ∗d (P, fd ,Ad)
((σ −1)pid(P,ϕ, fd,Ad)+σ fd) λ (ϕ,η)ϒ d(ϕ,η)
+M
∫
η
∫ ∞
ϕ∗x (P, fx,Ax)
((σ −1)pix(P,ϕ, fx,Ax)+σ fx) λ (ϕ,η)ϒ d(ϕ,η)
Combine with equation (4) and (5), we get
Lp =
M
ϒ
· ((σ −1)Π+σ ϒ f¯ )
where f¯ has been shown in Appendix 1. The labor for entrants Le is:
Le = Me ·Fe = δMϒ ·
Π
δ
=
MΠ
ϒ
Then total labor L is:
L = Lp+Le =
M
ϒ
· (σΠ+σ ϒ f¯ )
With equation (3), we have the number of incumbents:
M =
R
r¯
=
L
σ(δFe/ϒ+ f¯ )
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This equation has been shown in Appendix 1.
Appendix 2: Average productivity of exporters and non-exporters
Let ϕ∗d (zd) = ϕ
∗
d (P, fd,Ad) and ϕ
∗
x (zx) = ϕ∗x (P, fx,Ax) denote the cut-off productivities. Let
ϕ∗(zd,zx) = min{ϕ∗d (zd),ϕ∗x (zx)}. Then the probability of an entrant becoming active ϒ is
determined as:
ϒ=
∫
zd ,zx
∫
ϕ∗(zd ,zx)
g(ϕ)γ(zx)ψ(zd)d(ϕ,zd,zx)
According to equation (2), ϕ∗(zd,zx) = ϕ∗d (zd) if zd < τzx and ϕ
∗(zx,zd) = ϕ∗x (zx) if zd >
τzx. The distribution of incumbents is then g(ϕ)γ(zx)ψ(zd)/ϒ.
Therefore the average productivity of exporters can be denoted as:
Ψe =
∫
zd ,zx
∫ ∞
ϕ∗x (zx)
ϕ
g(ϕ)γ(zx)ψ(zd)
ϒ
M d(ϕ,zd,zx)∫
zd ,zx
∫ ∞
ϕ∗x (zx)
g(ϕ)γ(zx)ψ(zd)
ϒ
M d(ϕ,zd,zx)
=
∫
zd
∫
zx
∫ ∞
ϕ∗x (zx)
ϕg(ϕ)γ(zx)ψ(zd)dϕdzxdzd∫
zd
∫
zx
(1−G(ϕ∗x (zx)))γ(zx)ψ(zd)dzxdzd
In equilibrium, P is determined. Together with equation (2), we can get:
Ψe =
θ
θ −1 ·
∫
zx
ϕ∗x (zx)
1−θ γ(zx)dzx∫
zx
ϕ∗x (zx)
−θ γ(zx)dzx
=
θ
θ −1 ·
θ +β
θ +β −1 ·
Θ
P
· τZx
Let Sd denote the area {(zd,zx) |zd < τzx} and Sx the area {(zd,zx) |zd > τzx}. Average
productivity of non-exporters is :
Ψne =
∫
Sd
∫ ϕ∗x (zx)
ϕ∗d (zd)
ϕ
g(ϕ)γ(zx)ψ(zd)
ϒ
M d(ϕ,zd,zx)∫
Sd
∫ ϕ∗x (zx)
ϕ∗d (zd)
g(ϕ)γ(zx)ψ(zd)
ϒ
M d(ϕ,zd,zx)
=
∫
zd
∫ ∞
zd/τ
∫ ϕ∗x (zx)
ϕ∗d (zd)
ϕg(ϕ)γ(zx)ψ(zd)dϕdzxdzd∫
zd
∫ ∞
zd/τ
(G(ϕ∗x (zx))−G(ϕ∗d (zd)))γ(zx)ψ(zd)dzxdzd
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In equilibrium, P is determined. Together with equation (2), we can get:
Ψne =
θ
θ −1 ·
∫
zd
∫ ∞
zd/τ
(ϕ∗d (zd)
1−θ −ϕ∗x (zx)1−θ )γ(zx)ψ(zd)dzxdzd∫
zd
∫ ∞
zd/τ
(ϕ∗d
−θ −ϕ∗x−θ )γ(zx)ψ(zd)dzxdzd
=
θ +β
θ +β −1
θ +β +α
θ +β +α−1 ·
Θ
P
·Zd
Appendix 3: Average productivity in autarky and with trade
In autarky, the probability of an entrant becoming active ϒa is determined as:
ϒa =
∫
zd
∫
ϕ∗d (zd)
g(ϕ)ψ(zd)d(ϕ,zd)
The average productivity in autarky is:
Ψa =
∫
zd
∫ ∞
ϕ∗d (zd)
ϕ
g(ϕ)ψ(zd)
ϒa
M d(ϕ,zd)
M
=
∫
zd
∫ ∞
ϕ∗d (zd)
ϕg(ϕ)ψ(zd)dϕdzd∫
zd
(1−G(ϕ∗d (zd)))ψ(zd)dzd
=
θ
θ −1 ·
θ +α
θ +α−1 ·
Θ
Pa
·Zd
With trade the average productivity after trade can be expressed as:
Ψ =
∫
zx,zd
∫ ∞
ϕ∗(zd ,zx)
ϕ
g(ϕ)γ(zx)ψ(zd)
ϒ
M d(ϕ,zd,zx)
M
=
∫
Sd
∫ ∞
ϕ∗d (zd)
ϕg(ϕ)γ(zx)ψ(zd)dϕdzxdzd +
∫
Sx
∫ ∞
ϕ∗x (zx)
ϕg(ϕ)γ(zx)ψ(zd)dϕdzxdzd∫
Sd
(1−G(ϕ∗d (zd)))γ(zx)ψ(zd)dϕdzxdzd +
∫
Sx
(1−G(ϕ∗x (zx)))γ(zx)ψ(zd)dϕdzxdzd
=
θ
θ −1 ·
∫ ∞
Zd
∫ ∞
zd/τ
ϕ∗d (zd)
1−θ γ(zx)ψ(zd)dzxdzd +
∫ ∞
Zd
∫ zd/τ
Zx
ϕ∗x (zx)
1−θ γ(zx)ψ(zd)dzxdzd∫ ∞
Zd
∫ ∞
zd/τ
ϕ∗d (zd)
−θ γ(zx)ψ(zd)dϕdzxdzd +
∫ ∞
Zd
∫ zd/τ
Zx
ϕ∗x (zx)
−θ γ(zx)ψ(zd)dϕdzxdzd
=
θ
θ −1 ·
θ +β
θ +β −1 ·
α(θ−1)
θ+β+α−1Zd(
τZx
Zd
)
θ+β
+βτZx
αθ
θ+β+α (
τZx
Zd
)
θ+β
+β
· Θ
P
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Appendix 4: A decrease in foreign entry cost
λ ′( fx |ϕ,Ad,Ax) is the conditional distribution of foreign entry cost, and λ ( fx |ϕ,Ad,Ax)
is the conditional distribution with a decrease of foreign entry cost. Λ′( fx |ϕ,Ad,Ax) and
Λ( fx |ϕ,Ad,Ax) are the corresponding cumulative distributions. The change of conditional
profit ∆pi(P |ϕ,Ad,Ax) is then:
∆pi(P |ϕ,Ad,Ax) =
∫ f ∗x (P,ϕ,Ax)
0
( f ∗x (P,ϕ,Ax)− fx)(λ ( fx |ϕ,Ad,Ax)−λ ′( fx |ϕ,Ad,Ax))d fx
= ( f ∗x (P,ϕ,Ax)− fx)(Λ( fx |ϕ,Ad,Ax)−Λ′( fx |ϕ,Ad,Ax))| f
∗
x (P,ϕ,Ax)
0
−
∫ f ∗x (P,ϕ,Ax)
0
(−1)(Λ( fx |ϕ,Ad,Ax)−Λ′( fx |ϕ,Ad,Ax))d fx
=
∫ f ∗x (P,ϕ,Ax)
0
(Λ( fx |ϕ,Ad,Ax)−Λ′( fx |ϕ,Ad,Ax))d fx
With property of LEFC, i.e. Λ( fx |ϕ,Ad,Ax) ≥ Λ′( fx |ϕ,Ad,Ax), ∆pi(P |ϕ,Ad,Ax) ≥ 0.
Therefore pi(P |ϕ,Ad,Ax) becomes higher.
Appendix 5: Innovation
In order to analyse the effects of an increase in productivity, we assume that for two dis-
tributions of characteristics, the conditional distributions of productivity ϕ can ranked by
first-order stochastic dominance:
Higher Productivity (HP) For two distributions of characteristics λ and λ ′, λ has higher
productivity than λ ′ provided Λ(ϕ |η)≤ Λ′(ϕ |η) for all (ϕ,η).
With HP satisfied, the effects of an innovation will be the same effects as a decrease of for-
eign entry cost in Theorem 5, i.e., innovation pushes some pure exporters and non-exporters
out of the market and some ordinary exporters to become pure exporters or non-exporters.
Rearrange equation (7) to get:
k(x) =
∫ ∞
x
((ϕ
x
)σ−1
−1
)
λ (ϕ |η)dϕ
With property HP innovation will increase k(x). To see this, let λ ′(ϕ |η) denote the condi-
tional distribution of productivity and λ (ϕ |η) denote the conditional distribution with inno-
vation. Λ′(ϕ |η) and Λ(ϕ |η) are the corresponding cumulative distributions. The change
of k(x) is:
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∆k(x) =
∫ ∞
x
(
(
ϕ
x
)σ−1−1
)(
λ (ϕ |η)−λ ′(ϕ |η))dϕ
=
(
(
ϕ
x
)σ−1−1
)
(Λ(ϕ |η)−Λ′(ϕ |η)) |∞x −
∫ ∞
x
(σ −1)ϕσ−2
xσ−1
(Λ(ϕ |η)−Λ′(ϕ |η))dϕ
= −
∫ ∞
x
(σ −1)ϕσ−2
xσ−1
(Λ(ϕ |η)−Λ′(ϕ |η))dϕ
With property of HP, i.e. Λ(ϕ |η)≤ Λ′(ϕ |η), ∆k(x)≥ 0. Therefore k(x) is increased.
Therefore, k(ϕ∗d (P, fd,Ad)) and k(ϕ
∗
x (P, fx,Ax)) become higher. According to equation
(8), pi(P,ϕ |η) becomes higher, so does the expected profit Π(P). Therefore, price level
is decreased, leading to the same effects as a decrease of foreign entry cost in Theorem
5. The effects of innovation are channelled through active firms. The distribution of non-
active firms, i.e. firms with productivity lower than ϕ∗d (P, fd,Ad) and ϕ
∗
x (P, fx,Ax), makes
no difference to the results.
Appendix 6: Estimation of Productivity
To estimate the productivity of firms, the revenue function (sector k is omitted to ease nota-
tion) is:
lnYit = κ0+κ1 lnLit +κ2 lnKit +κ3 lnMit + lnϕit
To correct the simultaneity bias and selection bias, Olley and Pakes (1996) use investment
to control the unobservable productivity and survival probability to control the firm exit.
Following Amiti and Konings (2007) and Yu(2015), we add the export dummy in the in-
vestment function.
ln Iit = I(lnKit , lnϕit ,EXit)
We have data of depreciation Dit in our database. Thus the investment is measured as Iit =
Kit−Kit−1+Dit . The investment is positively related to productivity. Therefore, the inverse
function of investment is lnϕit = I−1(lnKit , ln Iit ,EXit). The production function is then:
lnYit = κ0+κ1 lnLit +κ3 lnMit +g(lnKit , ln Iit ,EXit)+ εit
where g(lnKit , ln Iit ,EXit) = κ2 lnKit + I−1(lnKit , ln Iit ,EXit). We use third-order polynomi-
als to approximate the g(·) to estimate the κ1 and κ3 as the first step.
g(lnKit , ln Iit ,EXit) = (α0+α1EXit)
3
∑
m=0
3
∑
n=0
αmn lnKmit ln I
n
it
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To estimate the κ2 requires a second step to estimate the survival probability to control
for the selection bias. The survival probability in t + 1 is estimated by third-order polyno-
mials in lnKit , ln Iit and EXit . Calculate the predicted probability Pˆit . In the third step, we fit
the following model by non-linear least squares to estimate κ2.
lnYit− κˆ1 lnLit− κˆ3 lnMit = κ2 lnKit +φ(gˆit−1−κ2 lnKit−1, Pˆit)+ εit
where φ(·) is approximated by third-order polynomials in gˆit−1−κ2 lnKit−1 and Pˆit . Then
the productivity is calculated by lnϕit = lnYit − κˆ1 lnLit − κˆ2 lnKit − κˆ3 lnMit . This esti-
mation is used for the main analysis in the empirical section. We also provide four other
methods to estimate the productivity.
The first one is to estimate of revenue function with Olley and Pakes (1996) approach and
more controls in investment function (OP revenue 2). The investment function is revised to
add the dummies of pure exporters and state-owned firms: ln Iit = I(lnKit , lnϕit ,EXit ,PEit ,SOEit).
Accordingly,
g(lnKit , ln Iit ,EXit ,PEit ,SOEit) = (α0+α1EXit +α2PEit +α3SOEit)
3
∑
m=0
3
∑
n=0
αmn lnKmit ln I
n
it
The survival probability in t+1 is estimated by third-order polynomials in lnKit , ln Iit , EXit ,
PEit and SOEit . We also estimate the value-added function:
lnValueaddedit = κ0+κ1 lnLit +κ2 lnKit + lnϕit
Olley and Pakes (1996) approach with controls lnKit , lnϕit and EXit (OP valueadded 1) is
similar to the estimation of revenue function, except that the coefficient of material is no
longer estimated. Olley and Pakes (1996) approach with more controls lnKit , lnϕit , EXit ,
PEit and SOEit (OP valueadded 2) is similar to OP revenue 2. We also provide the Levin-
sohn and Petrin (2003) approach (LP valueadded), where the unobservable productivity is
controlled by materials.
lnMit = M(lnKit , lnϕit)
Therefore, the productivity is controlled by lnϕit = M−1(lnKit , lnMit) in order to estimate
κ1. And then lnValueaddedit− κˆ1 lnLit = κ2 lnKit +φ(gˆit−1−κ2 lnKit−1)+εit is estimated
by non-linear least squares to get κ2. After estimating the value-added function, the produc-
tivity is calculated by lnϕit = lnValueaddedit− κˆ1 lnLit− κˆ2 lnKit .
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